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Abstract 
This paper contributes to the literature on the observed research funding and scientific 
productivity gender gap in science. On the basis of very detailed information for a sample of 276 
academics at the University of Turin over a ten year period, we develop a robust new model that 
takes into account the three main stages of the funding-productivity nexus: applying for a grant, 
successful fund raising and conducting the research, to investigate at which stage the gender gap 
emerges. In the model, we control for differences – not previously examined together - in the time 
allocated to teaching, administration and child care, which might moderate the gender effect. Using 
a Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS) model we control, for selection into funding, endogeneity of 
career progress and endogeneity of funding success, and find, first, that researchers who apply for 
grants are active in teaching and administration and show persistent funding application behaviour, 
but find no evidence of a significant gender bias; second, when we control for application selection, 
the negative gender correlation with funding acquisition becomes stronger, while teaching is 
negatively correlated to the amount of funding raised; and, third, controlling for selection and 
reverse causality, we find that funding is not associated to higher research productivity. At all 
stages of the funding-productivity nexus we find negative, albeit insignificant, secondary gender 
effects associated with administrative tasks, but less so with teaching. In the research impact-
quality estimations we provide evidence of a ‘motherhood penalty’ for female academics with 
young children who did not apply for funding (including evidence of a causal effect). In line with 
the literature, we find that, after controlling for children, female researchers are less productive in 
terms of publications, but not in terms of research quality or impact.  
 
Keywords: competitive funding, research productivity, women in science 
 
JEL Codes: I23, J16, O31  
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1. Introduction 
Universities are central to the production of new scientific and technological knowledge, 
and the process that explains the scientific productivity of university researchers remains to be 
better understood. The gender gap in scientific productivity, that is, the finding that female 
researchers tend to publish less than their male peers after controlling for observables, has, for 
many years, been central to this discussion and explaining this ‘productivity puzzle’ (Cole and 
Zuckerman, 1984) remains a priority.  
Recent contributions show that the gender gap extends to competitive funding 
(Lerchenmueller & Sorenson, 2018; Steinþórsdóttir et al., 2020). Since academics’ scientific 
productivity is said to be strongly influenced by the funding and governance structure under which 
they operate (Aghion et al., 2010), this could provide an explanation for the ‘productivity puzzle ’.  
In many countries in Europe, where universities were financed, primarily, by block grants, with 
little accountability for how these resources are used, governments have increased the amounts of 
funding distributed through competitive schemes (Geuna, 1999; Bolli and Somogyi, 2011). While 
individual competitive funding has received attention, with a large number of studies analysing 
different aspects relevant to our understanding of scientific productivity many of these works (due, 
mostly, to data accessibility issues) tend to focus on a subset of factors, but fail to capture the 
complexity of knowledge production including the productivity puzzle. These complexit ies 
include questions about whether any final productivity gap is due to mechanisms at work during 
the production of the research, reduced funding or female researchers selecting themselves out of 
the competition for resources and what are the relevant mechanisms at each stage of knowledge 
production that contribute to the gender gap.  
The present study addresses these questions and offers a more encompassing view of the 
funding-productivity-gender nexus in science. We model the interactions among different aspects 
of the science production function by  considering it a three-stage process starting with selection 
into applying for competitive funding, receipt of funding and scientific productivity (see Figure 
1), for men and for women. We consider differences between men and women in the time available 
for research, specifically, differences in time devoted to other academic activities such as teaching 
and administration, and non-academic activities such as caring for a small child. All three activities 
not only affect scientific productivity directly but also, by significantly influencing researchers’ 
time allocation, might crowd out other research related activities resulting in fewer applications 
and less funding and productivity. This effect should be stronger for women, who have been shown 
to devote more time to non-research activities (Xie and Shauman, 2003; Babcock et al., 2017; 
Blake and La Valle, 2001), which could create secondary gender effects. Of particular relevance 
is the possible differential impact on men and women of having a small child; caring for a new-
born could result in gender-biased time allocation decisions, but we do not know whether and at 
which stage in the funding-productivity relationship, this happens.  
In summary, for each of the three stages of research productivity, we assess the existence 
of primary gender effects and secondary gender effects mediated by (self-)selection of female 
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researchers in teaching, administration and parental activities. This allows us to identify at what 
stage differences between men and women emerge. The aim is not to explain the reasons for the 
phenomenon, but rather to highlight its relevance, if any, to research performance. 
Empirically, we rely on detailed information for a sample of 276 academics working in the 
physics and chemistry field at the University of Turin, over a ten-year period. We model fund-
raising success using a novel instrument that captures the academic’s socio-political role in the 
national academic network. In a final, four equation Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS) estimation, 
we account for selection into grant application, endogeneity of funding and endogeneity of career 
progression, to estimate a productivity equation for a series of output measures including number 
of publications, citations and journal impact adjusted publications, to investigate gender 
differences at each stage. 
Although the amount of competitive research funding in Italy is small (Geuna and Rossi, 
2015), we find that researchers who apply for grants show persistent funding application activity. 
We find no evidence of a significant gender bias at the application stage. However, also when we 
control for this selection into application, we find that women receive significantly less funding 
than men. When we account for selection and causality, we find that, although funding is not 
associated to higher research productivity, a productivity gap for women persists. At all stages of 
the funding-productivity nexus we find negative albeit insignificant secondary gender effects 
associated with administrative tasks, but less so with teaching. In the estimations that include 
citations to research publications, we find evidence of a ‘motherhood penalty’ for having young 
children, mainly for female academics who do not apply for funding. Our main results are 
confirmed in a series of robustness models using alternative dependent variables. 
 
 
Figure 1: Three stages of research productivity 
2. Competitive funding, scientific performance and the gender gap 
2.1 The funding-productivity-gender nexus 
In the literature, funding and research output are linked closely, since competitive funding 
can help researchers to secure funds for equipment and research assistance, which leads to more 
autonomy and flexibility (Stephan 2012). However, funding is not allocated exogenously; it 
depends on a decision by the academic to apply for funding, as part of a three stage funding-
research productivity process starting with the scientist’s decision to apply, followed by the award 
of funding, which lead to scientific research output (see Figure 1).  
Women have been found to lag behind at all three stages. For instance, there is a persistent 
gap in publication count, a phenomenon that has been described as the ‘productivity puzzle’ (Cole 
and Zuckerman, 1984). Some papers have also shown that women receive fewer citations to their 
Funding Application Funding Award Research Output
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work than men (Aksnes et al., 2011; Beaudry and Lariviere, 2016), though this is not confirmed 
in the majority of studies (van den Besselaar and Sandstrom, 2017; Lynn et al. 2019).  
A gap has been observed, also, in research funding where women are less likely to succeed 
and attract lower amounts of funding (Wenneras and Wold, 1997; Jagsi et al., 2009; Pohlhaus et 
al., 2011; van der Lee and Ellemers, 2015; Witteman et al., 2019).1 Blake and La Valle (2001), 
who investigated application behaviour based on surveys of potential funding applicants in the 
UK, further suggest that, even when eligible, women are less likely to apply for funding.  
However, these findings do not apply to all fields or all countries; and several studies do 
not find strong evidence of a gender gap in competitive fund raising (Marsh et al., 2011, Mutz et 
al., 2012). Also, Waisbren et al. (2008) found that the difference in funding success disappeared 
when controlling for seniority, since female researchers are underrepresented in senior positions 
(Ginther and Hayes, 1999). This is in line with the Matthew effect of accumulated advantage in 
the award of funding, which recognizes past success, experience and visibility as critical for 
funding success (Merton, 1988; Laudel, 2006; Perc, 2014). In addition, while several studies 
suggest that women are less likely to apply for funding, this tends to be explained by career stage 
differences or lower levels of ambition (see Steinþórsdóttir et al., 2020 for a review). However, 
empirical evidence on a possible gender gap in the decision to apply for a grant is scarce due to 
lack of appropriate data.  
To summarize, the gender literature focuses on productivity and funding separately and 
there are no studies that consider their interaction. Therefore, whether the final productivity gap is 
due to mechanisms at work during the production of the research, to reduced funding or to female 
researchers selecting themselves out of the competition for resources is unclear. 
2.2 Competitive funding and research performance 
To understand why women receive less funding and publish less, we need, first, to 
understand the relationship between the three stages of scientific productivity depicted in Figure 
1. Since competitive research funding is considered a mechanism to reward and, thus, incentivize 
the most able academics, the prior research generally assumes that funding is awarded to the best 
researchers. As a result, competitive funding tends to be associated to increased productivity, 
regardless of the sponsor (Jacob and Lefgren, 2011; Benavente et al., 2012; Hottenrott and 
Lawson, 2017).  
However, the literature suggests that not all types of public grants benefit academic 
performance and that, depending on the national scientific system and the way in which output is 
measured (publications vs citations), the effect might be more or less sizeable. For example, Arora 
et al. (1998), who assess national research grants for biotechnology in Italy and Arora and 
Gambardella (2005) who study National Science Foundation (NSF) funding in the US, find 
positive, but very weak effects on publications. Jacob and Lefgren (2011) explain the small effect 
                                                             
1 This difference in funding has been linked, in part, to the discounting of women’s research efforts, leading to 
undervaluation of proposals (Lerchenmueller and Sorensen, 2018; van der Lee and Ellemers, 2015; Witteman et al., 
2019). 
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they find for US National Institutes of Health (NIH) grants as due to other outside funding 
opportunities available to academics which can replace lost NIH funding. More controversially , 
Stephan (2012) suggests that the funding application and management process reduces the time 
available for research, which might explain the small performance effects. However, in the case 
of Russia, Ganguli (2017) finds that grants more than double publication numbers and explains 
this strong effect as due to low relative levels of funding in Russian universities. There are also 
several studies showing that public funding has a positive impact on the quality of scientific 
research and that sponsored academics are more highly cited and publish in higher impact journals 
(Chudnovsky et al., 2008; Jacob and Lefgren, 2011; Carayol and Lanoe, 2017). These effects are 
consistently larger than those observed for publication numbers.  
Nevertheless, some studies concede that selection biases may be driving the results for the 
effect of funding since more able researchers are not only more likely to be successful but also are 
more likely to actively select into funding competitions. In one of the very few papers investigating 
selection into applying for funding, Seyed Rasoli (2011) finds that, in the French context, 
publication performance is crucial for the researcher’s decision to apply. Accounting for this 
selection, she finds that funding success is not driven by individual performance, but rather by 
department prestige. However, she does not look at subsequent research outcomes and, to our 
knowledge, only Ayoubi et al. (2019) study how the decision to apply for competitive funding 
might influence future performance. Correcting for the selection bias present in all other studies , 
these authors find that, in the case of a Swiss collaborative funding programme, those competing 
for funding increase the number and quality of their publications, regardless of whether the 
application was successful, which, again, highlights the importance of self-selection. 
On the basis of the above discussion, we would expect the new knowledge produced to be 
a function of the academic’s cognitive capabilities and the amount of individual competitive 
funding raised. Funding might not be a direct causal factor of increased productivity since selection 
into applying for funding may indicate the start of a research path leading to higher research output, 
regardless of funding success. This situation is likely to be more frequent in scientific systems 
where researchers also receive non-competitive funding to run laboratories. In the hard sciences, 
in particular, laboratory resources have a major influence on academics’ performance (Carayol 
and Matt, 2006), since availability of laboratory assistants (doctoral or postdoctoral), equipment 
and materials is linked directly to individual productivity. In the case of Italy (and in most of the 
rest of Europe), research groups receive some level of basic funding from the university, to run the 
lab and hire doctoral and postdoctoral staff, but competitive funding is used increasingly to support 
the human and physical capital required. 
The above discussion indicates, also, that women, who may be more likely to remove 
themselves from the funding competition (Waisbren et al., 2008) and who may be disadvantaged 
in promotion and, thus, access to lab resources (Sonnert and Holten, 1995; Ginther and Hayes, 
1999; Mairesse and Pezzoni, 2015), are less able to pursue research paths leading to higher 
research output compared to men, which might explain the productivity puzzle.   
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2.3 Mechanisms: Teaching, administration and child care 
The three stages of research productivity are affected, also, by the time allocated to other 
time-intensive activities, which reduce the time available for research and for drafting research 
proposals and research papers. Of particular interest are teaching, administration and parental 
responsibilities, which, to date, have received little attention in the economics of science literature. 
Each of these activities may be gender-biased, introducing more time constraints on women, which 
result in lower funding application activity, less funding and lower productivity (secondary gender 
effects) compared to men.  
Indeed, prior studies have linked the gender gap in science to women’s higher teaching 
commitments (Xie and Shauman, 2003) and higher administrative responsibilities (Babcock et al., 
2017). Specifically, while teaching commitments are measured on the basis of class teaching 
hours, there are large differences in the time devoted to preparing for classes, marking exams and 
interacting with students. These differences apply, also, to administrative tasks, where the actual 
number of hours spent can vary significantly. Women tend to attach more importance to these 
‘thankless’, ‘low-promotability’  tasks and, thus, devote more (quality) time and effort to them, 
not all of which is measured (e.g., even if there is a time allocation attached, these tasks may 
receive different attention and care) (Babcock et al., 2017).  
The productivity gap has been linked, also, to women’s childcare responsibilities (Carr et 
al., 1998; Fox, 2005, Hunter and Leahey, 2010, Ceci and Williams, 2011), since they continue to 
shoulder a larger share of parental responsibilities compared to men. Indeed, several studies show 
that women in academia are less able to manage the time devoted to work and family life and can 
find themselves ‘stuck’ in caring responsibilities, with consequences for the time allocated to 
research (Acker and Armenti, 2004; Rafnsdóttir and Heijstra, 2013; Myers et al. 2020). 
2.3.1 Scientific productivity, teaching and administration 
Teaching is one of the university’s main missions and the majority of permanent academic 
staff have teaching duties.2 These commitments may not be closely aligned to their current 
research and may reduce the time available for raising research funding. However, due to the 
difficulty related to measuring teaching, the evidence is scarce and inconclusive. For instance, 
early evidence for the US suggests a trade-off between teaching and research (Boyer, 1991; Clark, 
1987) or a complementarity or null effect (Braxton, 1996; Mitchell and Rebne, 1995; Marsh and 
Hattie, 2002). More rrecently, Landry et al. (2010), for the case of a Canadian university, and 
Rahmandad and Vakili (2019) for the US case, find that teaching time and publications are 
substitutes. Finally, Bianchini et al. (2016) for the case of a technical university in Italy and García-
Gallego et al. (2015) for a university in Spain, observe a nonlinear relationship between research 
                                                             
2 Surveys in Germany and the UK find that academics spend between 20% and 30% of their time teaching and 20% 
of their time on administrative tasks (Hughes et al., 2016; Fudickar et al., 2018). In the case of Italy, all tenured 
academics have to provide a minimum number of teaching hours depending on their academic position; full professors 
are required to deliver 90 to 120 hours of lectures a year. 
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publications and teaching quality, that is, an initial positive link with diminishing returns for high 
numbers of publication.  
Thus, a higher teaching commitment may crowd-out time from research and applying for 
funding. Recent changes to the funding of academic research in Europe and, especially, in the 
context of research evaluations, are incentivizing academics to spend more time on sourcing 
research grants. In many countries, this does not imply some relief from teaching duties and, 
therefore, any funding acquired may not result in increased productivity. 
In addition to teaching, administrative duties can also affect the research activity of 
academics. The findings from investigations of the publication performance of academics in top 
managerial posts, show a decline in the numbers of both publications and citations during the 
appointment (Lou et al., 2018; Zhao et al, 2019). Lou et al (2018) studied more than a hundred 
department deans and university presidents in 29 universities worldwide and found this effect to 
be more pronounced for those serving in higher ranked universities. The drop in performance can 
be severe. For instance, Zhao et al. (2019) observed a drop of 20% in publication numbers and 
60% in citations, in the case of US university presidents. Thus, there is evidence of a relation 
between appointment to an administrative role and scientific productivity; research productivity 
and the time available for research are both reduced.  
The potential crowding out of research by teaching and administration may be higher for 
women since they tend to dedicate more time (accounted for and not accounted for) to these 
activities, which further amplifies any substitution effect at each stage of the research process.  
2.3.2 Scientific productivity and childcare  
In all countries, caring and domestic responsibilities are borne disproportionately by 
women, with women devoting more and better time to children (Craig, 2006; Rhoads and Rhoads, 
2012; Mason et al., 2013). Parental responsibility is of specific interest for policy and relevant to 
the case of Italy where surveys indicate that 70% of women’s time is allocated to family 
responsibilities (ISTAT, 2017),3 and that men have 80% more leisure time than women (OECD, 
2009). When the children are young and require more care, these domestic roles can have an 
especially negative impact on the time devoted to research with potentially long-term 
consequences for the careers of female academics (Mason et al., 2013; Myers et al., 2020).  
The evidence on childcare and scientific productivity is mixed and mostly limited to the 
US case. The most comprehensive study, based on the US Survey of Doctoral Recipients, looks at 
the effects of different child age groups. In the case of pre-school age children, it finds a positive 
effect on the number of publications for fathers and a negative effect for mothers (Stack, 2004). 
However, evidence of a fatherhood bonus, where men become the main breadwinners and are 
incentivized to be more productive and creative, and a motherhood penalty related to extra time 
caring for a new-born, might not be causal. For example, for male researchers, career planning 
might mean that they have children only after becoming established on a strong publications track. 
                                                             
3 The recorded asymmetry index in 2013-14, was below the 70% threshold (at 65.2%) for the first time (ISTAT, 2017). 
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Also, Stack (2004) does not consider research funding and the funding application decision and, 
therefore, leaves the stage in the research process when childcare has an impact an open question.  
To conclude, the above-discussed literature highlights a correlation between the 
academic’s gender and scientific productivity, but proposes only partial explanations for this 
relationship. It might be related directly to the academic’s gender (first level gender effect) or to a 
time allocation decision process that induces women to allocate less time to research relevant 
activities and more to teaching, administration and parental tasks (second level gender effect). 
These two effects may emerge at different stages in the funding-productivity chain: 1) at decision 
to apply for funding; 2) at funding success; or 3) in relation to research outcomes. These actions 
are not independent; female researchers might reduce proposal writing time to allow time for other 
commitments (e.g., may submit a small number of proposals to specific funding agencies) or 
refrain from applying for funding (selecting out of funding) to preserve the time for current 
research although this is likely to affect  future research. In either case, the decision will affect 
both the probability of the woman obtaining future funding and the time available to carry out 
research, with knock-on effects for her future productivity, in line with the Matthew effect related 
to accumulated advantage (Merton, 1988; Perc, 2014; Azoulay et al., 2014). In the econometric 
analysis, we test these alternative explanations for the funding and productivity gender gaps. 
3. Chemistry and physics at the University of Turin 
Our empirical analysis relies on data on all academic staff in the chemistry and physics 
departments at the University of Turin during the period 2000 to 2009. In this section, we briefly 
review the funding situation of academics in Italy, and in Turin. 
The Italian university funding system is quite complex and there are areas of inefficient 
resource allocation. Prior to the onset of the 2008 global economic crisis, Italian researchers 
bemoaned the low levels of financing and budget cuts (Hellemans, 2002; Nature, 2008; Feresin 
and Abbott, 2008). Since 1993, national state funding for universities consisted of a single grant, 
the Fondo di Finanziamento Ordinario or FFO,4 which was allocated mainly on a historical basis , 
although, more recently, has been based more on teaching and research performance (about 20% 
of the FFO). In addition to FFO income and student fees, a share of university financing is derived 
from project-based competitive sources. These include international financing (e.g., European 
Union competitive funding) and several national and regional research programmes, which, 
however, are not well funded. The two main national project-based competitive funding 
programmes are PRIN (Progretti di Ricerca di Interesse Nationale, National Relevance Research 
Projects) and FIRB (Fondo Italiano Ricerca di Base, Italian Basic Research Fund) which was 
established in 2001.5 Between 2001 and 2009, FFO allocated between 54.3% and 61.5% of total 
financing, while project-based competitive funding accounted for between 7.2% and 11.4% 
(Geuna and Rossi, 2015). 
                                                             
4 See Rossi (2009) for a historical introduction to Italian university financing. 
5 PRIN financing is described in Bellotti (2011), which focuses, in particular, on social networks in the field of particle 
physics. 
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The University of Turin is a large Italian university (Rolfo and Finardi, 2014), which, in 
the academic year 2019-20, included 2,012 academic staff (full, associate and assistant professors) 
and 1,846 technical staff. It is the sixth largest university in Italy based on professor numbers.6 It 
has some 23,600 first year students and total student enrolment of around 79,000 including over 
1,100 doctoral students. In 2019, approximately 13,800 students graduated from the University of 
Turin. Its consolidated income in 2018 was €461.9 million.7 Historically, chemistry and physics 
are among the University of Turin’s most important research areas. In the 2011-2014 national 
research evaluation (VQR), out of the group of the nine largest universities, the University of Turin 
was ranked second for physics, and combined first (with Florence University) for chemistry. The 
group of large universities in Italy includes the most research intensive universities, positioning 
physics and chemistry in Turin at the top of the Italian system. The University of Turin also 
performs well in international rankings. In the 2005 to 2018 Academic Ranking of World 
Universities (ARWU),8 Turin was in the top nine Italian universities; it was ranked fifth and sixth 
in 2014 and 2015 respectively and was ranked between fourth and sixth during the period 2004-
2008. Internationally, Turin was ranked between 151st and 200th in the period 2004-2008, and 
between 201st and 300th in 2009-2018 (151st-200th in 2014 and 2015). Therefore, the University 
of Turin can be considered a leader in the fields of chemistry and physics, in Italy and in Europe. 
4. Data and variables 
4.1 Data 
Our data contain detailed information on all 276 full, associate and assistant professors in 
physics and chemistry and associated disciplines, working at the University of Turin during the 
years 2000 to 2009.9 In the timespan considered, academics were affiliated to seven departments: 
General physics, Experimental physics, Theoretical physics, General and organic chemistry, 
Inorganic physical and materials chemistry, Analytical chemistry and Pharmaceutical sciences.  
We retrieved full names, dates of birth, scientific field, gender and academic role 
(full/associate/assistant professor) for 239 academics in service between 2007 and 2009, from the 
University of Turin’s central administration, provided by the office responsible for managing the 
central Catalogue of Scientific Production. This catalogue was established in 2007 and records 
data from 2007 onwards. Information on years of tenure for 239 academics plus 37 who retired 
from the university between 2000 and 2009 were retrieved from the Italian University Research 
and Education Departments website which provides information on university staff in Italy. This 
resulted in a total of 276 names of individual academics. Appendix Tables A1 and A2 present data 
                                                             
6 After Roma “La Sapienza”, Bologna, Napoli “Federico II”, Milano and Padova universities. 
7See: https://www.unito.it/ateneo/chi-siamo/unito-cifre and 
https://www.unito.it/sites/default/files/bilancio_esercizio_2018.pdf (both in Italian, last accessed February 2020). 
8 See http://www.shanghairanking.com (last accessed February 2020). 
9 Professors in Science Sectors in Italy (as defined by the Italian Ministry of Research) are indexed as CHIM 
(CHIM/1 to CHIM/12) and FIS (FIS/1 to FIS/8), and Engineering (ING-IND/21). Science sector definitions and 
associated scientific research interests are available at the Italian ministry website 
http://cercauniversita.cineca.it/php5/settori/index.php (in Italian, last accessed February 2020) 
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on university academics’ entries and exits and number of years present in the sample. These data 
are supplemented by information on postdoctoral researchers and doctoral students obtained from 
the Doctorate and Research Grants Office of the university’s Research and International Liaisons 
Division. 
Data on competitive research funding applications and awards were obtained from the 
university’s Research and International Liaisons Division and integrated with public data posted 
on the university’s website. Academics receive funding from four different sources: regional, 
national, EU and industry. Full data on funding applications and award amounts are available for 
Italian national (PRIN, FIRB, etc.) and regional (Regione Piemonte) competitions. Data on 
national funding were complemented by data from the Italian University Ministry website; 
regional funding information was obtained from the university’s administration. 
Funding from EU Framework Programmes (EU FP) were retrieved from several sources. 
For the most part, funding data were retrieved by manually searching the EU FP database on the 
CORDIS website, and checking against the EUPRO database (Roediger-Schluga and Barber 
2008). Where the share of funding allocated to the University of Turin was not available, we 
estimated it based on the number of partners and type of project. Information on industry funding 
was collected, but, since it was neither complete nor reliable at the individual level, we excluded 
it from the analysis.10 
We also collected data on teaching, administrative posts and children. Information on 
teaching hours are from official university records, but are not available for all academics or all 
years. The econometric model is based on observations for 262 academics, for 220 of whom we 
have original teaching information from 2003 onwards. For all years prior to 2003 and for the 42 
missing cases we imputed teaching time. Teaching in Italy is a fixed part of academic work and, 
in theory, all professors must contribute a minimum number of teaching hours since teaching 
buyouts were not allowed in the period considered. However, there are several exceptions to this 
rule, in terms of both a smaller number of teaching hours (e.g., due to administrative appointments 
such as Vice-rector, School Dean or Department Director, sabbatical leave, etc.) or a higher 
number of hours (e.g., due to understaffing with respect to teaching needs, resulting in either 
voluntary higher teaching loads or, in the case of junior staff, contracted hours of teaching 
attracting minimal extra pay). Administrative positions were collected from official university 
documents and archived university websites; they include the most senior positions of School Dean 
and Department Director, as well as the position of Degree Programme Director and of Degree 
Coordinator. . Finally, number and year of birth of the children of each academic in the dataset 
were obtained through telephone contact. Since we were unable to reach some retired staff, the 
number of academics was reduced to 264. 
For all 276 academics, we collected data on scientific publications for the years 1998 to 
2010 from the Elsevier Scopus database. 11  This included publications prior to obtaining a 
                                                             
10 Department aggregate data underscore the small relevance of industry funding, with a relatively more important 
role in chemistry, captured in the model by a science field dummy. 
11 Data were retrieved from the Scopus database (https://www.scopus.com) in May-June 2013. Scopus was preferred 
to other similar web-based databases because: 1) it includes a wider set of data (it reports more than 20,500 titles, 
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permanent position at the University of Turin. In most cases, we used the ‘author search’ option 
on Scopus, controlling for homonyms and spurious reference assignments. In some cases, 
homonyms or faulty assignment of references forced us to collect or check the information 
manually. The downloaded records included number of citations received at 2013 (year of data 
collection) and number of co-authors. To obtain an additional measure for publication 
impact/quality, each publication was ascribed a citation impact measure derived from Elsevier 
CiteScore.12 
We assigned each academic to a research laboratory. Most labs are grouped around a full 
professor and include associate and assistant professors, post-docs and doctoral students. We were 
able to identify 89 such research labs among our 7 departments, varying in size from 1 to 16 
permanent staff. For the three chemistry departments, research lab composition was derived from 
the respective department’s official website. For the three physics departments and the 
pharmaceutical sciences department, the websites reported the composition of only some of the 
labs. For the missing labs, we made assumptions, based on a method involving analysis of co-
authorship among professors and the personal knowledge of one of the authors of this paper (see 
Appendix 1). 
Complete information on all the variables was available for 262 academics in the database. 
The 14 academics for whom we have only incomplete information are still included in the 
calculation of relevant laboratory measures. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and 
correlations for the measures used in the regressions. The final empirical model, including all the 
variables, is estimated for 262 academics and includes 2,097 person-year observations 
4.2 Dependent Variable 
Our dependent variable is academic research performance. We construct three alternative 
variables of research performance based on publications information, as follows. We created a co-
author adjusted publications count (adj. publications) by dividing each publication by the number 
of authors and summing by year. This accounts for differences in the relative authorship 
contribution of different academics in the sample. 13 Next, we calculated the year normalized 
average number of citations received by these articles (norm. citations). Normalization addresses 
the potential year truncation problem in the citations measure. We follow the methodology 
suggested in Hall et al. (2001) and Crespi and Geuna (2008) and scale citation counts by dividing 
them by the within-sample average citation count for the same year. This gives a higher weight to  
                                                             
some 19,500 peer-reviewed journals plus other sources, from more than 5,000 international publishers); 2) it covers 
several non-English language titles; 3) it includes a larger number of proceedings which, for physics, are particularly 
relevant. 
12 CiteScore is based on the journal’s citation average over the previous 3 years which is the methodology used for 
Thomson Reuters Journal Impact Factor. 
13 Fractional counts are considered due to the presence in the sample of professors working in the field of particle 
physics, which involves huge experiments (such as those conducted at CERN) and can involve multiple publications 
per year coauthored by hundreds of authors. In the robustness check in Appendix 2, we exclude those academics and 
use full counts with consistent results. 
13 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics and Correlation Table 
     Correlations 
 mean sd min max   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11)   (12)   (13)   (14)   (15)   (16) 
Dependent variables                     
(1) Adj. publications 0.73 0.80 0.00 7.00 1.000                
(2) Norm. citations  0.81 1.00 0.00 11.41 0.141 1.000               
(3) CiteScore (average) 2.65 1.88 0.00 17.03 0.314 0.454 1.000              
Independent variables                     
(4) Italian funding (in €10k) 1.07 6.14 0.00 131.57 0.270 0.043 0.116 1.000             
(5) Ln(Italian funding+1) 1.72 3.89 0.00 14.09 0.238 0.053 0.102 0.459 1.000            
(6) Female 0.38 0.48 0.00 1.00 -0.236 -0.044 -0.034 -0.102 -0.195 1.000           
(7) Teaching hours 3.77 1.62 0.00 10.93 0.026 -0.052 -0.000 -0.011 0.064 -0.104 1.000          
(8) Administrative role 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 0.113 0.013 0.029 0.012 0.129 -0.094 0.137 1.000         
(9) Small child (0-3yrs) 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 -0.021 0.081 0.090 -0.045 -0.053 0.080 -0.025 -0.050 1.000        
Controls                     
(10) (Age-50)/10 0.01 1.13 -2.20 2.50 -0.003 -0.121 -0.184 0.115 0.205 -0.264 0.048 0.193 -0.361 1.000       
(11) Professor 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.115 0.009 0.055 0.166 0.291 -0.224 0.039 0.317 -0.239 0.653 1.000      
(12) Chemistry 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.040 -0.097 0.106 0.085 0.061 0.178 0.103 -0.084 0.028 -0.186 -0.059 1.000     
(13) Ln(avg. # coauthors+1) 1.77 0.98 0.00 5.74 0.120 0.251 0.281 0.017 0.017 -0.053 -0.053 0.061 0.019 -0.070 0.114 -0.264 1.000    
Instruments                     
(14) Social capital 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.046 -0.023 0.024 0.056 0.141 -0.024 -0.022 0.065 -0.019 0.086 0.136 0.114 -0.020 1.000   
(15) Ln(other lab fund+1) 13.72 0.92 11.26 15.03 0.034 -0.069 0.085 0.101 0.103 0.160 0.060 -0.032 0.053 -0.140 -0.041 0.834 -0.226 0.119 1.000  
Selection variable                     
(16) Application 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 0.196 0.051 0.096 0.231 0.457 -0.149 0.103 0.125 -0.042 0.169 0.229 0.014 0.078 0.111 0.035 1.000 
Lab measures                     
Single person lab 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 -0.107 -0.121 -0.237 -0.036 -0.046 -0.042 0.001 -0.070 -0.062 0.142 -0.107 -0.122 -0.229 -0.018 -0.112 -0.055 
Lab size 4.75 3.17 1.00 16.00 -0.059 -0.038 0.089 0.003 -0.040 0.120 0.055 -0.011 0.048 -0.114 0.014 0.181 0.077 0.011 0.169 -0.031 
(Mean age lab-50)/10 -0.05 0.62 -1.85 2.10 -0.065 0.002 -0.091 -0.077 -0.080 0.017 -0.025 0.020 -0.004 -0.066 -0.136 -0.280 0.069 -0.122 -0.205 -0.074 
Professors lab 0.31 0.28 0.00 1.00 0.016 0.128 0.121 -0.035 -0.094 0.028 -0.039 -0.003 0.03 -0.199 -0.092 -0.149 0.236 -0.085 -0.114 -0.073 
Publications lab 0.65 0.56 0.00 4.64 0.193 0.141 0.208 0.050 0.041 -0.016 -0.053 0.049 0.064 -0.113 0.022 0.099 0.075 0.029 0.091 0.056 
Citations lab 16.29 18.26 0.00 201.00 0.096 0.262 0.200 0.049 0.045 0.005 -0.020 0.011 0.008 -0.060 0.092 -0.015 0.186 -0.017 -0.035 0.007 
CiteScore lab 2.41 1.54 0.00 10.04 0.143 0.186 0.305 0.083 0.043 0.049 -0.031 0.016 0.074 -0.142 0.077 0.168 0.196 0.039 0.142 0.036 
Ln(EU-ITA fund lab+1) 4.74 5.35 0.00 14.15 0.072 0.057 0.120 0.060 0.058 -0.000 -0.010 0.010 0.042 -0.121 -0.062 0.131 -0.038 -0.006 0.190 -0.013 
PhD Student hours 4.56 4.73 0.00 24.50 0.275 0.115 0.202 0.173 0.155 -0.109 0.057 0.037 0.03 -0.051 0.018 0.145 0.130 0.018 0.108 0.189 
Postdoc hours 2.59 3.98 0.00 48.00 0.124 0.152 0.191 0.136 0.116 -0.120 0.021 0.055 0.028 0.042 0.126 -0.089 0.130 0.024 -0.059 0.149 
Initial performance                    
Zero initial publications 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 -0.175 -0.156 -0.189 -0.044 -0.092 0.147 0.045 -0.033 0.001 -0.077 -0.125 0.131 -0.271 -0.044 0.115 -0.101 
Ln(initial adj. pub) 0.42 0.86 -2.48 2.30 0.411 0.148 0.233 0.216 0.278 -0.208 0.103 0.120 -0.069 0.141 0.291 0.062 0.023 0.099 0.047 0.235 
Zero initial citations 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 -0.175 -0.156 -0.189 -0.044 -0.092 0.147 0.045 -0.033 0.001 -0.077 -0.125 0.131 -0.271 -0.044 0.115 -0.101 
Ln(initial year norm. cit) 0.57 0.94 -3.70 2.52 0.218 0.341 0.380 0.090 0.104 -0.088 -0.028 0.037 0.139 -0.055 0.128 0.030 0.367 0.024 0.026 0.097 
Zero initial CiteScore 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 -0.186 -0.166 -0.207 -0.046 -0.097 0.165 0.034 -0.038 -0.005 -0.063 -0.134 0.141 -0.294 -0.046 0.123 -0.108 
Ln(initial CiteScore) 1.81 0.83 -2.02 3.36 0.262 0.272 0.363 0.112 0.137 -0.184 -0.002 0.090 0.042 0.067 0.268 -0.054 0.385 0.040 -0.049 0.121 
Note: Due to space restrictions, correlations amongst lab measures are reported in Appendix Table A3. No. of observations is 2,097, no. of academics is 262, observation period is 
2001-2010. The citation variables refer to the numbers of citations received to autumn 2013. We applied the average CiteScore for 2011-2014. The initial performance variables 
refer to the pre-sample period 1998-2000. All independent variables are 1-year lagged. 
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more recent years. Finally, we calculate the average yearly CiteScore of publications , 
corresponding to the average journal impact of the published work.  
4.3 Independent Variable 
Our main explanatory variable is competitive funding, applied for to and received from 
national and regional funding bodies. While this funding can be used by the entire lab, the Principal 
Investigator (PI) is responsible for drafting proposals, managing the funding and making research 
decisions. Therefore, we consider funding application and receipt at PI level. Funding application 
takes the value 1 if an application was submitted; research funding received (Italian funding) is 
split across the award period (typically 3 years).14 Due to the large size and infrequency of EU 
funding, and the multiple researchers involved, we consider it at the lab level (see Section 4.4). In 
our sample, 62% of academics submitted at least one application during the observation period. 
Most academics made only one application, resulting in a sample mean of 23%. Funding success 
is highly skewed, with a few successful applicants (36% of academics). The average amount of 
funding received was just over €10k. 
We consider the academic’s gender to measure any potential gap in research activity. In 
our sample, 38% are women, and the female variable is weakly negatively correlated to applying 
for funding, funding amount and productivity (see Table 1). Mean comparisons reported in Table 
2 show that the difference between men and women for publication numbers is high, with women 
producing a third fewer publications. The difference for the quality/impact measures is weaker and 
insignificant in the case of Citescore. However, differences in applications for funding are very 
large with women applying just over half as many times as men and receiving just a third of the 
funding amount, providing some first indication of primary gender effects. 
 
Table 2: Mean differences between men and women for core variables 
Main variables 
Men 
Obs = 1307 
Women 
Obs = 790 
Mean difference  
(t-test) 
Adj. publications 0.874 0.486 0.388*** 
Norm. citations  0.847 0.756 0.091** 
CiteScore (average) 2.699 2.568 0.131 
Ln(Italian funding+1) 2.309 0.748 1.560*** 
Application 0.279 0.149 0.130*** 
Teaching hours 3.899 3.552 0.347*** 
Administrative role 0.142 0.080 0.063*** 
Small child (0-3yrs) 0.096 0.148 -0.052*** 
Other variables    
(Age-50)/10 0.246 -0.368 0.614*** 
Professor 0.431 0.210 0.221*** 
*** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
 
                                                             
14 The results are confirmed in unreported tests using a funding dummy instead of funding amount. Results available 
upon request. 
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We consider teaching, administration and child-care as secondary gender effects and 
include these as main variables which we interact with female. We measure teaching as the number 
of teaching hours per week, a measure rarely included in empirical analyses. Missing values in 
this measure were imputed using the individual’s mean number of teaching hours in other years 
and mean number of teaching hours of other staff of the same rank, from the same department in 
the same year. In the final estimation, taking account of missing values in other measures, about 
45% of observations were linked to imputed teaching hours. The number of teaching hours per 
week is 3.8 and varies between zero and 10.9 (a maximum of 330 hours per year, with a mean of 
approximately 110 hours and a standard deviation of 48 hours). We included a measure for each year 
that the academic held an administrative position within the department, which applied to 61 
academics in the sample period (or 12% of observations). The women in our sample, who, on 
average, are of lower academic ranking, are less likely to hold administrative positions as only full 
professors can have leadership roles. Women, also, provide slightly fewer hours of classroom 
teaching (see Table 2). Our expectation is that women would devote more ‘real’ time to these tasks 
and that the effect would differ between men and women, generating a secondary gender effect. 
To capture parental responsibilities we include a dummy measuring whether the academic 
cares for a child aged between 0 and 3 years (small child).15 Since we expect the effect of child 
care to differ between men and women, we interact these two variables. The share of academics 
with young children during the observation period is 24%, accounting for 11.5% of observations 
(10% for men and 15% for women) 
4.4 Controls 
For each academic staff member, we were able to obtain the academic’s age and professor 
status. We centre age on 50 (the mean) and divide it by 10 to ease reading of the coefficients. Both 
measures are time-variant. We include a field dummy for chemistry staff (reference is physics). 
All these data were available for the full population of academics. In the estimations for average 
citation numbers, we control for the average number of coauthors since the literature suggests 
there is a strong correlation between number of authors and citations received (Tahamtan et al., 
2016; Wuchty et al., 2007). 
Each academic is assigned to one of the 89 identified research labs or groups. Research lab 
assignment allows us to calculate the size of each lab (lab size) in terms of number of permanent 
academic staff. Some labs consist only of a single permanent member of staff, others comprise 10 
or more. Mean lab size is 5 and the median is 4. We follow Carayol and Matt (2006) and compute 
lab group characteristics based on all permanent members of the group excluding the focal 
academic. We measure average age (centring age on 40 and dividing by 10) of research lab 
colleagues (mean age lab) and the share of full professors (professors lab) in each research group. 
We also include group members’ average publication performance (publication lab) after 
                                                             
15 We assume the effect of children will be strongest during the first 3 years of the child’s life when state care is not 
readily available. This is a stricter assumption than in Stack (2004), which considers all pre-schoolers. In additional 
tests we found that the effect of having an older child (aged 4-6) is insignificant, which supports our assumption. 
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correcting for co-authorship, and average citations (citation lab), or CiteScore (CiteScore lab) in 
the CiteScore equations. These group measures are not available for labs with just one permanent 
member of staff so we included a dummy for single person lab (single person lab) and set all group 
characteristics to zero. This applies to 17% of labs, accounting for 14% of observations. Academics 
receive competitive funding, mostly from national sources, and some from international (EU) 
sources. During the 2004 to 2009 period, 17 academics received EU funding. Given the large size 
of these projects they cannot be considered individual projects; thus, we split them across the whole 
lab with the result that EU funding is combined with national and regional Italian funding, to obtain 
a measure of total funding received by other members of the research lab. Again, we split the 
research funding across the award period and calculate the average amount of funding (EU-ITA 
funding lab) received per lab member (not including the focal researcher) per year. Finally, we 
include data on PhD students (PhD student hours). We calculated the number of person months 
per year available to each lab and divided this by the number of lab members. Data on PhD students 
are available from year 2004 and were imputed for earlier years.16 The mean number of PhD 
student months is 4.6. An additional lab variable is post-doc hours, which is included in the 
selection model predicting selection into funding (see section 5.3). The mean number of postdoc 
months available to each academic per year is 2.6. 
5. Estimation model 
We conduct a step-wise empirical analysis estimating three different models of scientific 
productivity. The first considers a model of funding and productivity, taking into account the 
endogeneity of award of funding, but not selection. We expand this model to account for reverse 
causality between productivity and parenthood. Finally, in the full model we consider selection 
into funding competition, thus, estimating all three stages of the funding-productivity chain. At 
each stage we consider primary and secondary gender effects. 
5.1 Instrumental variable model 
First we estimate a model assessing the impact of individual competitive funding on the 
new research being produced, with funding lagged one year in line with the literature.17 Research 
productivity is measured as the number and quality or impact of published journal articles. There 
are a number of biases in the estimation of this relationship, the most relevant being the 
endogeneity of competitive funding, which means that Ordinary Least Square (OLS) models 
would overestimate the effect of funding on research performance. Therefore, we need to find a 
way to isolate the variation in funding success. 
To this end, since national and regional competitive funding budgets differ by year, we 
exploit the exogenous variation in timing of funding by including year fixed effects. In addition, 
we make use of an Instrumental Variable (IV) model. We define an instrument, namely, the 
                                                             
16 Results for PhD student hours are robust in the reduced sample estimations not reported here. 
17 Results are robust to a 2 year lag.  
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academic’s national socio-political capital, with the expectation that it will affect the probability 
of success in obtaining national competitive funding. In several countries, there is evidence of 
some form of an elite or alumni (e.g., old boy) network effect (Feinberg and Price, 2004; Viner et 
al., 2004; Shibayama and Geuna, 2016; Fisman et al., 2017; Jang et al., 2017) in the allocation of 
competitive funding. Viner et al. (2004: 447) call this ‘political hegemony over resources’, which 
is expected to be particularly dominant if resources are scarce. Here, we measure academic national 
socio-political capital as occupying leading management roles in the Italian Physics and Chemistry 
Societies. Whilst we acknowledge that some level of scientific excellence is required for 
appointment to such positions,18 we claim that such influential roles are the result, mainly, of a 
socio-political process. More importantly, we expect the socio-political capital associated to these 
types of positions to be correlated to a higher probability of receiving funding from either national 
or regional funding agencies. Such local social capital would not give priority access to the 
international publication system and, thus, should not directly affect publication performance. 
Clearly, using the same instrument for the UK and US could potentially be problematic.  
In our sample, 14 academics were elected for at least one year (maximum 6 years non-
continuous) to one of these top leadership positions. They were mostly senior men, with women 
systematically underrepresented in positions of power (Morley, 2014). However, due to the low 
overall number of observations, the difference between men and women is insignificant (see Table 
2). A dummy variable measuring socio-political capital takes the value 1 for the first year of top 
leadership responsibility and the three succeeding years, to account for the expected longer term 
effects.19 
Although this instrument varies across the time window considered, the variance is small, 
so we include a second instrument. Organizational studies show that human behaviour is affected 
by isomorphism (Dacin, 1997; Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2017), that is, individuals tend to behave 
similar to how other people in the organization behave. In science, academics in the same field 
will be affected by the fund-raising behaviour of peers (Tartari et al., 2014), they will tend to 
perform similar activities to their peers and accumulate skills in these activities, which we describe 
as isomorphism. While we cannot consider the funding received by close peers, we exploit 
information on the funding success of academics in unconnected research labs in the same 
discipline (in our sample we consider 82 research labs and two disciplines; see data description 
above). This considers the fundraising of academics that do not work in the same area of research 
expertise as the focal academic, but would be working in close proximity to the focal academic 
and be subject to the same research evaluation mechanisms. In other words, the more funding 
raised by academics in labs other than the focal one, the greater the likelihood that an academic in 
the focal lab will receive individual funding without this impacting directly on his or her 
publication performance. We further tested the statistical appropriateness of the two instruments 
                                                             
18 In our sample, 4 chemists received a prestigious Italian medal award; only 2 had held major administrative roles in 
the Italian Chemical Society. In auxiliary regressions, we confirmed that this is not correlated to the outcome variables. 
19 The effects hold, also, if we consider other time windows, such as limiting the effect to the membership period or 
the 5 years following it. This consistency shows that the socio-political capital built through these memberships is not 
lost in the short or medium term. 
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in auxiliary regressions which confirmed that they are not individually or jointly significant in the 
outcome equations. 
We consider the differential effect for women in the first and second stage of the IV model 
to estimate primary gender effects and the existence of a gender gap. Further, if, as applies to 
universities in continental Europe, funding cannot be used to free up time from teaching or 
administrative tasks, and academics experience competing demands on their time, then funding 
may not always lead to higher performance. Commitments related to having a young child can 
also compete with research time and, therefore, are considered. All three effects are expected to 
be stronger for women compared to men (secondary gender effects) and, therefore, are interacted 
with the female dummy. 
We need to consider a second source of endogeneity - promotion to a higher academic rank. 
Mairesse and Pezzoni (2015: 83) note that “career advancement and scientific productivity are 
strongly related” with high-performing academics more likely to be promoted to professor and 
higher-ranked academics having greater access to resources and networks, resulting in 
performance advantages. The authors use a 2SLS model that includes the probability of being a 
professor in the performance regression instead of the actual rank dummy. We follow their 
approach and estimate a promotion equation using the academic’s research productivity in year t-
1, whether they are female, age and its squared term, and year and department dummies. We then 
include the predicted promotion value in the first stage IV regression and run the productivity 
equations. The complete model is: 
𝑃𝑖𝑡(𝜑) = 𝜑[𝐼𝐶?̂?𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑃?̂?𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑂𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝐿𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑇𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝑒𝑖 + 𝐴𝑑𝑖𝑡 −1 × 𝐹𝑒𝑖 + 𝐶𝑖𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝑒𝑖] + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
𝐼𝐶?̂?𝑖𝑡(𝛾) = 𝛾[𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝑃?̂?𝑖𝑡 + 𝑂𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡1 + 𝐿𝑅𝑖𝑡1 + 𝑇𝑒𝑖𝑡 × 𝐹𝑒𝑖 + 𝐴𝑑𝑖𝑡 × 𝐹𝑒𝑖 + 𝐶𝑖𝑡 × 𝐹𝑒𝑖] + 𝜗𝑖𝑡  
𝑃?̂?𝑖𝑡(𝛿) = 𝛿[𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑂𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡] + 𝜇𝑖𝑡         (1) 
where 𝜑, 𝛾 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛿  are the vectors of the parameters to be estimated. P measures research 
productivity, ICF individual competitive funding and Pr promotion to a higher academic rank. 
OIC measures other individual characteristics, such as age, LR measures lab characteristics, Te is 
teaching, Ad is administration and C denotes existence of a young child. Interactions with Fe, 
indicating that the academic is a woman, are included. IV are instrumental variables and the error 
term 𝜖 is uncorrelated to the fitted values of 𝐼𝐶?̂?and 𝑃?̂?. 
5.2. Reverse causality and unobserved heterogeneity 
To explore the possibility that the effect of child care is not determined by scientific 
productivity prior to having children, we follow the suggestion in Wooldridge (2002) to include 
the logarithm of the academic’s ‘initial productivity’ in the outcome equations in the 2SLS model. 
This complements the predicted promotion measure which already captures a dynamic second 
order past research performance effect. The initial productivity variables capture path dependence 
and cumulative advantage effects in research productivity. They proxy, also, for the otherwise 
unobserved permanent heterogeneity of individual academics such as their cognitive capability, 
motivation and talent (Fernández-Zubieta et al., 2016; Mairesse and Pezzoni, 2015). This measure 
has the advantage that it enables us to control for these biases while still allowing us to consider 
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other invariant factors, such as gender, in our model. We consider research performance in the 
three years prior to the sample period, that is, 1998 to 2000, as the initial value and include the 
logged average as well as a dummy to indicate the ‘zero’ initial value in the model. These also 
enter the first stage of the IV model. 
5.3. Modelling selection into funding 
Equation (1), while correcting for multiple sources of bias, does not correct for potential 
selection into applying for funding. As noted in Section 2, the decision to apply for funding is not 
random, but is determined endogenously, with academics making the decision to opt in or out of 
the competition for grants. A modelling approach that accounts for selection has the advantage 
that we can estimate the propensity to apply for funding. Thus, a selection stage equation can be 
very informative for understanding who applies for funding. In the selection equation, we include 
the activities that compete for academics’ time and, thus, may affect proposal writing time. We 
include predicted promotion, which captures career stage and performance, and past applications 
since we expect persistence in applying for funding (Bol et al., 2018). As an exclusion restriction, 
we include the number of postdoc hours available in the academic’s lab. Postdocs are often asked 
to prepare funding proposals for the lab and, therefore, their availability should have a direct 
impact on the ability to apply. We test the appropriateness of the restriction in auxiliary regressions 
and confirm that the variable is insignificant in the funding and outcome equations. 
The selection is estimated as: 
𝑃𝑟(𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 )𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃[𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑃?̂?𝑖𝑡 + 𝑂𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡1 + 𝑇𝑒𝑖𝑡 × 𝐹𝑒𝑖 + 𝐴𝑑𝑖𝑡 × 𝐹𝑒𝑖 + 𝐶𝑖𝑡 × 𝐹𝑒𝑖 + 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑡−1] + 𝜎𝑖𝑡   (2) 
where 𝜃 is the parameter being estimated and ER is the exclusion restriction. We next estimate the 
2SLS model in equation (1). To do this, we estimate separate equations for those who applied and 
those who did not apply for funding. We set the selection to 1 for the three years after a funding 
application since this is the usual funding window and, therefore, the period when we would expect 
to see an effect of funding. We include the inverse Mills ratio (𝛼𝜌) in the IV model equation (1). 
A statistically significant 𝛼𝜌indicates that selection bias would be ignored if we did not model the 
decision to apply. 
6. Empirical Analysis 
6.1 2SLS IV regression 
We estimate equation (1) as a 2SLS, taking logs plus the units of the publication and 
funding measures to correct for their skewness.20 All explanatory variables are lagged one year, 
which means that publications in 2010 are estimated based on 2009 individual and lab 
characteristics. Year fixed effects are included in all the models and standard errors are clustered 
at the individual and laboratory levels (nested). Table 3 reports the promotion equation and first 
and second stages of the 2SLS model 
                                                             
20 Unreported tests using a count publication measure rather than a log dependent variable, confirm the overall results.  
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The promotion equation in Table 3 column 1 shows that being a professor is linked to prior 
performance, but, unlike Mairesse and Pezzoni (2015), we find no evidence of a significant 
promotion disadvantage for women (the female dummy is negative, but not significant). The 
predicted professor effect is positive and significant in both the first stage funding equation and 
the second stage productivity equation. This is due to second order past research performance 
effects, which determine future productivity while, at the same time, determining the likelihood of 
obtaining funding. These effects are particularly strong in the first stage, where the amount of 
funding awarded to professors is almost four times higher than that awarded to more junior 
members of staff. The first stage instrument equation shows, also, that our instruments are good 
predictors of funding. The effects can be interpreted as elasticities and show that members of 
esteemed organizations receive two-and-a-half times more funding than non-members.21 Funding 
by other labs in the same field is also positive, predicting an increase in the focal academic’s 
funding of more than 50% for a 100% increase in funding to other labs. Both instruments are 
jointly significant and satisfy the test for exogeneity.  
In terms of gender differences, we find a strongly significant negative correlation between 
female researcher and amount of competitive funding, with funding being 90% less for women 
compared to men, suggesting serious gender differences in access to resources. Since the model 
includes a promotion equation that controls for past performance and other individual and lab 
characteristics, the gender difference might be driven by either gender biased funding allocation 
or differences in proposal quality, drafting or selling skills between women and men.  
Concerning secondary gender effects, we found no evidence of a negative effect of teaching 
on the probability of raising money. Taking an administrative position has a negative coefficient 
for women, albeit insignificant. In auxiliary regressions that include only leading administrative 
posts, we observe a negative, significant interaction effect suggesting that female top 
administrators may have less time to develop successful grant applications and, thus, receive 
significantly less funding. However, we should highlight that the high coefficient may due to the 
small number of women holding such top administrative posts. 
Further, there is no negative effect of being female with young children on the probabilit y 
of raising money, which suggests that parental duties likely do not correlate with the quality of 
proposal writing and, thus, the probability of winning a competitive grant. 
In terms of control variables, we find that the share of full professors in the lab has a strong 
negative sign, which indicates that individuals in a lab with a higher share of full professors will 
raise less funding. For example, an increase in the share of full professors in the lab from 31%, the 
mean, to 50%, decreases the amount of individual funding by about a third. PhD student hours are 
strongly positive, underlining the relevant support role provided by doctoral students in either 
having good research ideas, drafting good quality research proposals or freeing time for the PI to 
write research proposals. 
                                                             
21 The log includes a unit that was added so as not to lose observations with zero funding. This unit can be ignored in 
the case of funding where €1 more makes little difference to the overall amount received, and the effects can be 
interpreted as elasticities.  
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Table 3: Results of two-stage least square regression on research outcomes 
 Probit 1st Stage (1) (2) (3) 
 Professor Ln(Italian funding+1) Ln(adj.publications+1) Ln(norm.citations+1) Ln(CiteScore+1) 
 b se b se b se b se b se 
Ln(Italian funding+1)     0.003 0.022 0.004 0.017 0.020 0.034 
Female -0.148 0.248 -0.957** 0.485 -0.178*** 0.049 -0.040 0.060 -0.023 0.091 
Teaching hours   0.064 0.106 -0.007 0.009 -0.007 0.010 -0.001 0.017 
Female#Teaching hours   0.050 0.120 0.017 0.011 0.008 0.013 0.006 0.020 
Administrative post   0.784 0.539 0.083 0.052 -0.019 0.039 0.077 0.063 
Female#Administrative post   -1.164 0.736 -0.069 0.071 0.100 0.075 -0.101 0.107 
Small child (0-3)   0.294 0.560 0.037 0.069 0.138** 0.056 0.156** 0.063 
Female#small child   0.021 0.619 -0.120* 0.067 -0.151** 0.067 -0.228** 0.093 
Controls           
(Age-50)/10 1.641*** 0.149 -0.394 0.241 -0.199*** 0.028 -0.132*** 0.029 -0.359*** 0.047 
(Age-50)/102 -0.345*** 0.097 -0.264** 0.119 -0.046*** 0.014 -0.017 0.011 -0.016 0.019 
Pr(professor)   3.596*** 1.052 0.627*** 0.135 0.323** 0.132 0.917*** 0.194 
Ln(coauthors+1)       0.095*** 0.012   
Lab measures           
Single person lab   -1.507*** 0.576 -0.148** 0.068 -0.004 0.055 -0.172* 0.092 
Lab size   -0.075* 0.041 -0.010*** 0.004 -0.007* 0.004 -0.002 0.007 
Mean age lab   0.287 0.291 -0.019 0.029 -0.037 0.032 -0.103** 0.044 
Professors lab   -1.844** 0.730 -0.033 0.074 0.081 0.081 0.228** 0.116 
Publications lab   -0.365 0.232 0.043 0.034 0.031 0.034 -0.049 0.040 
Citations lab   0.000 0.006 -0.001 0.001 0.004*** 0.001   
CiteScore lab         0.053** 0.022 
Ln(EU-ITA funding lab+1)   0.022 0.029 -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.004 0.003 
PhD Student hours   0.104*** 0.033 0.015*** 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.017** 0.008 
Chemistry   -0.446 0.374 -0.011 0.040 -0.044 0.039 -0.063 0.056 
Instruments           
Social capital   2.596** 1.297       
Ln(Italian funding other labs+1)   0.504*** 0.156       
Ln(l.adj.pub+1) 0.517** 0.231         
Ln(l.citations+1) 0.217*** 0.065         
Joint sign. of department dummies (6) 7.61          
Constant -1.527*** 0.362 -5.221*** 1.840 0.349*** 0.072 0.159** 0.067 0.630*** 0.101 
Pseudo/Adjusted R2 0.497    0.244  0.219  0.228  
Hansen J-test (p-value)     0.154  0.132  0.921  
Underidentification test (p-value)     0.00137  0.00142  0.00150  
dydx(Female) -0.027 0.044 -0.900*** 0.276 -0.138*** 0.038 -0.015 0.031 -0.040 0.050 
Note: N = 2097; clusters = 262 in individual id, 86 in lab. *** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). Year dummies included; robust clustered standard 
errors. Publication counts are co-author adjusted. Citations are year normalized. First stage regression for adjusted publication count is reported. First stage estimations 
for normalized citations and CiteScore are similar and available upon request. 
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Table 3 Models 1 to 3 respectively report the results for co-author adjusted publication 
count, normalized average number of citations and average CiteScore. After instrumenting, we 
find no significant link between funding and publications, citations or CiteScore. These results 
show that, after removing potential sources of endogeneity, funding does not have a significant 
effect on performance, although this should be contextualized to the Italian system where 
national competitive funding plays a marginal role (less than 10% of total university research 
funding). 22   
We next look at primary and secondary gender effects. In Model 1 (adjusted 
publications), the female dummy exerts the strongest influence among these variables, entering 
negatively, in line with prior research. When we calculate elasticities, we find that, on average, 
women produce 14% fewer publications than men. The primary gender effect is insignificant 
for citations and Citescore, suggesting that after controlling for other factors, women do not 
publish lower quality/impact research. 
Teaching hours are negative in the publication and citation models, but the coefficients 
are small and non-significant. 23  Women’s teaching responsibilities are positive, but 
insignificant, which suggests that, in the Italian case, teaching is not correlated to scientific 
productivity for either men or women. Administrative roles enter insignificantly; their 
interaction with gender is negative but also insignificant. However, due to convention and 
regulation of the Italian system only full professors can be appointed to the most senior 
administrative positions and, therefore, any effect may be captured by the professor variable. 
The marginal effects of the interaction between female and having a child are depicted 
in Figure 2. The interaction between being female and having small children is negative, and 
weakly significant in the publications count model, indicating that women caring for a small 
child publish less than those without children. In the citation model (Table 3 Model 2), the 
female dummy is insignificant, but the interaction with children is significant and negative, 
while the children dummy for men is positive. The CiteScore model in Table 3 Model 3, 
confirms the positive effect of young children for men and the negative effect for women. This 
indicates that women academics with young children receive fewer citations than men with 
children, which might be explained by the parental role separation in childcare. While fathers 
take on the role of breadwinner and their partners assume domestic responsibilities, women do 
not benefit from this separation; they tend to have to perform both work and domestic roles 
and their performance in terms of citation numbers reduces. Thus, when women are caring for 
young children, a citations performance gap emerges between men and women. This might be 
because women are unable to devote enough time to developing or promoting research with a 
high impact (Acker and Armenti, 2004; Rafnsdóttir and Heijstra, 2013; Myers et al. 2020). For 
instance, women may not be able (due to physical and psychological strain) to devote the time 
required for extensive revisions or may be unable to attend international meetings to present 
their research, which reduces its visibility. We tested for visibility by checking whether single -
authored publications from women authors receive fewer citations than those authored by men; 
                                                             
22 A base OLS model that does not account for endogeneity of funding is presented in Appendix Table A4. The 
base model, in line with prior research, shows a positive, albeit small, effect of individual competitive public 
funding. 
23 This is confirmed in models that do not include the imputed values. 
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however, we found no evidence that this was the case. Nevertheless, we cannot rule out loss of 
visibility during child caring years as a possible explanation for reduced publications impact. 
 
Figure 2: Predicted outcome variables by gender and parenthood 
(full estimation results presented in Table 3) 
 
The control variables provide some interesting insights. Publications, citations and 
CiteScore are associated to higher academic rank, but generally decrease with age. The 
citations model confirms the positive correlation to co-author numbers, in line with prior 
research. Lab size is correlated negatively to publications and citations numbers, but seem not 
to be related to article CiteScore. Average age of lab members has a negative effect in the 
CiteScore model, suggesting that academics working in groups that include older members, on 
average, produce lower quality research compared to those whose colleagues are younger. The 
share of full professors in the lab has a positive sign in the CiteScore model, but has no effect 
in the publications and citations count models. Lab performance in terms of quality/impact is 
correlated strongly to citations and CiteScore, while lab funding is insignificant in all the 
models. We found, also, that the number of PhD student hours is linked positively to 
publications and CiteScore. This highlights the relevant role played by postgraduate students 
in the successful operation of labs in Italy; the larger the number of PhD students in the PI’s 
lab, the higher the number (and the impact) of papers they produce.  
6.2 Controlling for reverse causality 
Figure 2 shows that a productivity gap in terms of publication quality/impact emerges 
between men and women with the presence of young children. While we can assume that men 
are encouraged and are more able to focus on their research work, we cannot rule out a positive 
citation and CiteScore effect for men stemming from their opting for fatherhood once a 
performance advantage is achieved. In other words, we cannot rule out reverse causality. 
In the descriptive analysis depicted in Figure 3, we observe that men who become 
fathers outperformed male peers with no children prior to their becoming fathers and this 
performance advantage increases further once the child is born. The analysis is limited to 
academics under the age of 45, which covers the main period for becoming parents among both 
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average performance compared to women who never have children, but this performance 
advantage disappears once the child is born. 
To investigate further whether this gender effect is determined by performance prior to 
having a child, we control for initial performance, as described in Section 5.2. This allows us 
to control, also, for overall time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity and cumulative 
publication advantage. The results of the outcome equation of the 2SLS model reported in 
Table 4, show that the initial value enters positively in the outcome equations and reduces the 
positive child effect for men, rendering it insignificant for citations, while the negative child 
effect for women remains almost unchanged. This suggests that the female effect is causal, 
while we cannot reject the hypothesis of reverse causality for male researchers, that is, that 
they decide to become fathers once they are become established on a high performance path. 
In the first stage equations, the negative correlation between female researcher and 
amount of competitive funding is confirmed with funding being 77% less for women compared 
to men. Also, in terms of secondary gender effects, the administrative position effect for 
women turns significant, confirming  that female administrators suffer a time substitution effect 
with fund raising. At the same time, administration now enters significantly positive in Model 
1 (adjusted publications), suggesting that researchers taking administrative responsibilit ies 
tend to be more productive. 
Most control variables lose some magnitude after controlling for initial performance, 
although the signs remain largely unchanged. Lab effects turn largely insignificant with the 
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Table 4: Results of two-stage least square regression on research outcomes controlling 
for initial condition 









 b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Individual Italian funding  -0.010 0.002 0.015 
  (0.023) (0.016) (0.026) 
Female -0.628 -0.110** 0.029 0.083 
 (0.518) (0.053) (0.053) (0.074) 
Teaching hours 0.054 -0.006 0.001 0.008 
 (0.105) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Female#Teaching hours -0.000 0.005 -0.005 -0.009 
 (0.130) (0.013) (0.011) (0.016) 
Administrative post 0.829 0.105** 0.005 0.074 
 (0.525) (0.052) (0.035) (0.055) 
Female#Administrative post -1.352* -0.109 0.029 -0.104 
 (0.774) (0.070) (0.070) (0.084) 
small child (0-3) 0.276 0.034 0.070 0.089 
 (0.512) (0.068) (0.057) (0.057) 
Female#small child 0.061 -0.115* -0.137** -0.223** 
 (0.582) (0.067) (0.068) (0.088) 
Controls     
  (Age-50)/10 -0.217 -0.169*** -0.126*** -0.335*** 
 (0.225) (0.028) (0.024) (0.044) 
  (Age-50)/102 -0.164 -0.024* -0.005 0.019 
 (0.107) (0.012) (0.010) (0.015) 
   Pr(Professor) 2.651*** 0.471*** 0.267** 0.753*** 
 (1.016) (0.124) (0.107) (0.160) 
   Ln(Coauthors+1)   0.050***  
   (0.014)  
Chemistry -0.502 -0.005 -0.069** -0.038 
 (0.353) (0.036) (0.034) (0.047) 
Zero initial adj.pub | norm.cit | -0.075 -0.143*** -0.117*** -0.025 
   CiteScore (0.446) (0.037) (0.032) (0.085) 
Ln(initial adj.pub | norm.cit |  0.718*** 0.141*** 0.125*** 0.262*** 
   CiteScore) (0.191) (0.028) (0.018) (0.032) 
Instruments     
   Social capital 2.400*    
 (1.255)    
   Ln(Italian funding other 
labs+1) 
0.520***    
(0.159)    
Constant -5.559*** 0.307*** 0.205*** 0.111 
 (1.917) (0.071) (0.074) (0.090) 
Lab controls YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2  0.291 0.282 0.334 
Hansen J-test (p-value)  0.439 0.139 0.860 
Underidentification test (p-
value) 
 0.00126 0.00155 0.00146 
dydx(Female) -0.774*** -0.119*** -0.003 0.011 
 (0.272) (0.037) (0.022) (0.040) 
Note: N = 2097; clusters = 262 in individual id, 86 in lab. *** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 
10%). Year dummies are included; robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Publication counts are co-
author adjusted. Citations are year normalized. First stage regression for adjusted publication count is reported. 
First stage estimations for normalized citations and CiteScore are similar and available upon request.  
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6.3 Controlling for selection 
The estimations reported above may suffer from selection bias. We address this by 
accounting for selection into applying for funding (equation (2)). The number of observations 
is reduced to 1,846 since we include a lagged application variable in the selection model to 
account for the Matthew effect in applying for funding (Bol et al., 2018).  
Table 5 Model 1 reports the results of the selection stage. It shows that the decision to 
apply is linked to the predicted professor effect, which also captures second order past research 
performance effects, and to prior funding applications. The exclusion restriction, post-doc 
hours, is positive and significant. We find no evidence of a gender or child effect. However, 
we do find a positive effect of teaching hours and administrative position. While we would 
assume that these activities could be substitutes in the academic’s time allocation, it appears 
that this is not the case. Anecdotal evidence for the Italian system confirms polarization, with 
a group of most productive researchers engaging in all academic activities (Bianchini et al.  
2013). We do not find strong evidence of secondary gender effects in the selection, though for 
women having an administrative position is negative albeit insignificant. 
Table 5 Model 2 shows the results of the first stage of the 2SLS model on publications 
for those that selected into funding. Taking account of selection is crucial for estimating 
funding success as indicated by the strongly significant inverse Mills ratio (𝛼𝜌) in the first 
stage of the 2SLS. The social capital IV is no longer significant in this model. This suggests 
that there is some level of self-selection taking place at the application stage, with those lacking 
social capital not applying for funding. However, both instruments are jointly significant (p = 
0.0220). Due to the selection, the negative marginal effect for women increases in this 
estimation compared to the model without selection. Calculation of elasticities suggests that 
after accounting for selection, the negative gender effect becomes stronger and that men receive 
120% more funding compared to women. This indicates that a gender biased funding allocation 
and/or differences in proposal quality, drafting or selling skills may be influencing award of 
funding (e.g., Steinþórsdóttir et al., 2020). 
Teaching hours enter negatively, suggesting that lack of proposal writing time may lead 
to lower quality proposals. The effect is significant only at the 10% level and is insignificant 
in the first stage equation for citations count or CiteScore. Holding an administrative post 
remains positive but insignificant while the gender interaction stays negative and insignificant. 
Once selection is taken into account, all the lab controls become insignificant, with the 
exception of a negative effect of professors in the lab.  
Table 6 Model 1 shows the results of the 2SLS model on publications for those that 
selected into funding competition. In addition, Model 2 shows separate results for those that 
did not apply for funding. Therefore, we have two sets of outcome estimations for those 
actively seeking funding and those not doing so. The equivalent estimations for citations and 
CiteScore are presented in Models 3 and 4, and 5 and 6 respectively. 
The outcome equations confirm the insignificant funding effect in Tables 3 and 4. The 
marginal effect shows that women, regardless of whether or not they applied for funding, have 
fewer publications than men. However, they do not produce lower quality research. Teaching 
and administrative roles are insignificant for almost all outcomes; administration entering 
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positively in Model 1 (publications of those that select into funding) and Model 6 (CiteScore 
of those that select out of funding).  
In the research quality equations, a negative female-child interaction effect is found 
only for those that did not apply for funding. Instead, women that select into applying for 
competitive funding do not differ from men in terms of their publication performance , 
regardless of whether or not they have children. This result may be indicative of the career 
priorities and ambitions of the women and men in the two sub-samples. The other coefficients 
are largely consistent between the two sub-samples, with secondary gender effects for teaching 
and administration (mostly negative) not significant.   
We are aware that our results might be sensitive to changes in the dependent variables . 
To check the sensitivity of our results, we tested them in alternative regressions, reported in 
Appendix 2. They confirmed our overall findings.  
 
Table 5: Results of selection and first stage of two-stage least square regression on 
accounting for selection 
 
 Selection 2SLS 1st stage 
 Application Ln(Italian funding+1) 
 b se b se 
     
Female -0.174 0.219 -0.975 1.284 
Teaching hours 0.057* 0.031 -0.238* 0.138 
Female#Teaching hours 0.008 0.050 -0.059 0.295 
Administrative post 0.219* 0.122 0.268 0.610 
Female#Administrative post -0.210 0.252 -0.040 1.631 
Small child (0-3) 0.101 0.230 0.499 0.771 
Female#small child -0.041 0.285 0.255 1.106 
Controls     
(Age-50)/10 -0.107 0.089 0.539 0.435 
(Age-50)/102 -0.124*** 0.039 -0.160 0.309 
Pr(professor) 0.993*** 0.291 -1.087 1.400 
Chemistry 0.066 0.099 -2.463* 1.417 
Postdoc hours 0.032*** 0.009   
Lagged Application  0.734
*** 0.097   
Zero initial adj.pub   1.814 1.104 
Ln(initial adj.pub)   1.612*** 0.371 
Instruments     
Social capital   1.275 1.257 
Ln(Italian funding other labs+1)   2.056*** 0.767 
𝛼 𝜌   -0.399*** 0.071 
Constant -1.529*** 0.188 -20.026** 9.638 
Lab controls NO  YES  
Observations 1846  753  
IDs 257  162  
Pseudo R2 0.144    
dydx(Female) -0.047* 0.026 -1.200** 0.569 
Note: *** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). Year dummies included; robust standard errors, 





Table 6: Results of two-stage least square and OLS regressions accounting for selection 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Ln(adj.publications+1) Ln(norm.citations+1) Ln(CiteScore+1) 












 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Ln(Italian 
funding+1) 
-0.034  -0.001  -0.020  
(0.027)  (0.019)  (0.028)  
Female -0.284** -0.055 0.140 -0.003 0.219 0.139* 
 (0.113) (0.053) (0.118) (0.067) (0.185) (0.074) 
Teaching hours -0.008 -0.015 0.004 0.002 0.012 -0.003 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.017) (0.010) (0.016) (0.015) 
Female#Teaching 
hours 
0.030 -0.005 -0.033 0.004 -0.053 -0.012 
(0.027) (0.012) (0.025) (0.015) (0.042) (0.019) 
Administrative post 0.101** 0.055 0.006 0.051 0.027 0.169** 
 (0.049) (0.083) (0.039) (0.069) (0.057) (0.077) 
Female#Administrat
ive post 
-0.008 -0.058 -0.072 0.078 -0.159 -0.157 
(0.090) (0.094) (0.086) (0.105) (0.107) (0.108) 
Small child 0.108 -0.028 -0.007 0.088 0.115 0.069 
 (0.086) (0.073) (0.046) (0.066) (0.089) (0.060) 
Female#small child -0.127 -0.064 -0.050 -0.195*** -0.067 -0.296** 
 (0.110) (0.079) (0.104) (0.073) (0.136) (0.134) 
Controls       
  (Age-50)/10 -0.173*** -0.173*** -0.100* -0.142*** -0.299*** -0.390*** 
 (0.040) (0.030) (0.052) (0.025) (0.050) (0.053) 
  (Age-50)/102 -0.003 -0.012 -0.006 0.004 0.041 0.024 
 (0.027) (0.013) (0.022) (0.014) (0.026) (0.019) 
   Pr(Professor) 0.368*** 0.412*** 0.201 0.271*** 0.613*** 0.824*** 
 (0.123) (0.119) (0.138) (0.099) (0.154) (0.161) 
   Ln(Coauthors+1)   0.068* 0.044***   
   (0.035) (0.014)   
Chemistry 0.044 -0.042 -0.050 -0.089** 0.086 -0.113** 
 (0.052) (0.043) (0.053) (0.036) (0.066) (0.056) 
Zero initial adj.pub |  0.006 -0.144*** -0.070 -0.142*** 0.168 -0.046 
norm.cit | CiteScore (0.097) (0.035) (0.084) (0.033) (0.115) (0.091) 
Ln(initial adj.pub | 0.261*** 0.104*** 0.133*** 0.111*** 0.295*** 0.243*** 
norm.cit | Citescore (0.065) (0.024) (0.028) (0.018) (0.034) (0.035) 
𝛼 𝜌 -0.024* -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.022* -0.009** 
 (0.013) (0.002) (0.013) (0.004) (0.013) (0.005) 
Constant 0.562*** 0.278*** 0.216 0.206*** 0.327* 0.184* 
 (0.176) (0.090) (0.198) (0.067) (0.198) (0.105) 
Lab controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 753 1087 753 1087 753 1087 
IDs 162 205 162 205 162 205 
Adjusted R2 0.155 0.257 0.195 0.333 0.206 0.371 
Hansen J-test (p-
val.) 
0.479 0.407 0.338 0.900 0.255 0.696 
Underidentification 
test (p-value) 
0.0342  0.0497  0.0285  
dydx(Female) -0.173** -0.087** -0.011 -0.009 -0.032 0.040 
 (0.061) (0.031) (0.040) (0.031) (0.079) (0.040) 
Note: *** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). Year dummies are included; robust standard 




In this study, we revisited the funding-productivity nexus looking, in particular, at 
primary and secondary gender effects. We add to existing studies by considering all stages of 
the research process from the decision to apply for funding, success in being awarded funding 
for research, and producing the research output. We further considered the role of gender at 
each stage, examining direct effects and effects mediated by other academic and non-academic 
activities, such as teaching, administration and parental responsibilities, to shed new light on 
the ‘productivity puzzle’. We proposed and implemented a new estimation model, employing 
2SLS, with a promotion equation and an IV equation for individual competitive funding, to 
address potential endogeneity concerns. We controlled, also, for performance differences ex-
ante, allowing us to validate the direction of causality of the gender effects. In accounting for 
selection into applying for funding, we provide unique insights into differences between 
applicants and non-applicants. Further, we include information on teaching, administration and 
child care commitments, which might compete with academics’ efforts to raise funding or 
publish their research, effects we expect to be stronger for women. Given the problems 
associated to correct measurement of the production of new knowledge, in this paper we proxy 
research output using a large set of measures to capture output quantity and quality/impact. All 
the robustness checks confirmed our main results. 
To address selection and endogeneity concerns not dealt with sufficiently in the existing 
literature, we developed a 2SLS IV based model to account for selection into funding, in which 
we showed that individual competitive funding is linked inherently to individual characteristics 
such as career stage, prior performance, gender and socio-political capital. These findings are 
in line with the existence of a Matthew effect related to accumulated advantage in applying for 
and receiving funds, as suggested in the prior literature (e.g., Laudel, 2006; Perc, 2014; 
Steinþórsdóttir et al., 2020). Women were found to raise less funding than men, an effect that 
was larger after accounting for selection, which could be an indication of gender biased funding 
allocation (as suggested by van der Lee and Ellemers, 2015 and Witteman et al., 2019) or 
differences in proposal quality, drafting or selling skills (due, possibly, to gendered language; 
van der Lee and Ellemers, 2015).  
Taking account of these differences in access to research funding, we have shown that 
competitive research funding does not translate into higher numbers of publications or higher 
quality/impact. We shed new light, also, on the relationship between gender and research 
productivity. We showed that women produce fewer, but not lower quality research papers, 
which is consistent with the previous literature (e.g. Lynn et al. 2018). When we examined the 
impact of caring for a young child, we found that women produce lower impact research 
(motherhood penalty). This suggests that women who have responsibility for young children 
are unable to devote enough time to developing or promoting high impact research. Indeed, 
prior studies suggest that women encounter more difficulties managing work and family life, 
in effect limiting the time they can allocate to extensive revisions or to promoting their research 
compared to men (Acker and Armenti, 2004; Rafnsdóttir and Heijstra, 2013). The current 
COVID-19 pandemic has increased this burden further, which may amplify gender differences 
in the coming years (Myers et al. 2020). We found that the child-care effect is driven by those 
30 
that do not apply for funding, suggesting some level of self-selection in terms of career and 
research ambitions between the subsamples of applicants and non-applicants. The group 
producing the most highly cited research is men with young children, which points to their 
embrace of the role of breadwinner, in line with Stack (2004). However, if we control for past 
performance level, this effect becomes insignificant, which suggests that the decision to have 
children is a strategic one for men. 
We found evidence, also, of a rather complex interaction between gender and other 
academic activities. Teaching seems not to be a relevant constraint on the conduction of 
research (no significant correlation with our productivity measurements); however, we found 
some evidence that those active in applying for grants are also more involved in teaching, but 
that the quality of the proposals could suffer from the time devoted to teaching commitments, 
resulting in lower funding success. As for teaching, we found that researchers involved in 
administration are more inclined to apply for funding and some are also more productive. These 
results provide some support to the view of a system in which there is a subgroup of highly 
active researchers able to perform on each of the three main tasks of university life (teaching, 
research and administration) for which time substitution effects seem to be less relevant. We 
found no significant second level gender effect associated to teaching, while we found some 
weak evidence that female academics involved in administrative duties (especially at the 
highest level) are less prone to submit new research proposals and raise funding. This could be 
due to women devoting more time to these tasks or having more difficulty in managing time 
between competing tasks, resulting in lower propensity to apply for and obtain funding, 
publications and citations. 
There are some limitations we need to acknowledge. Our results are specific to a 
national research system where grant-based funding is low and teaching buy-outs are not the 
norm. This situation could be comparable to other countries in Europe, where block funding 
still dominates. However, the results might be different for countries where competitive 
funding is favoured, such as in the UK and the US, or is indispensable such as in Russia. Also, 
in the period considered, national competitive funding suffered some discontinuity. Therefore, 
lack of a relationship between caring for children and raising competitive money might have 
been affected by the co-occurrence of having children and lack of opportunities to apply for 
competitive funds, yet, this would have affected all academics. The dataset used for this study 
is small, is limited to one university and covers only a 10 year window. While our results are 
robust, we would encourage further studies using larger datasets.  
We found that a leading management position in the Italian Physics and Chemistry 
Societies more than doubles the amount of funding received, which is concerning from a policy 
perspective. This situation is not unique to Italy; there is evidence of it in China and the US 
(Feinberg and Price, 2004; Fisman et al., 2017). However, appointment to an esteemed position 
in such societies is not always linked to merit and, even if merit plays a part, other networks 
should receive the same funding preferences. In Italy, where funding is particularly scarce, this 
dominance of elite networks could impede research progress seriously. The socio-polit ica l 
capital effect vanishes when we account for selection into applying for funding. We argue that 
this is due to self-selection out of the funding race, by academics who lack these network links.    
In terms of further policy implications of our study, we can conclude that unless support 
systems are put in place for women with childcare responsibilities, funding will not translate 
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into more or more highly-cited publications. In the current pandemic, women with children 
have experienced even stronger limitations on their work time (Myers et al. 2020); therefore, 
addressing these disparities and providing additional support is ever more critical.  
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Appendix 1: Methodology used to assign professors in Physics to research groups based 
on coauthorship. 
All the professors in a department were arranged in an 𝑛 × 𝑛 matrix, where 𝑛 is the number of 
professors. Given funding structure of the Italia system, full professors were identified as PIs. 
All publications of the professors were scanned in order to check for coauthorship, and a 
coauthorship matrix was built. Stronger links (a steady coauthorship in the 2000-2009 
timespan) and weaker links (some publications in previous years or only sporadic 
coauthorship) were inserted in the matrix. Finally from stronger coauthorship research groups 
have been built around one, or in few cases two, full professor. The assumption made is that 
professors in the same group tend to have a steady pattern of recent coauthorship (when 
research groups are steady) but may from time to time collaborate with colleagues external to 
the group or may have done in the past, either due to a different organization or to old 
connections such as a former professor-student relationship. 
 
Appendix 2: Robustness Checks 
We conduct a number of robustness checks that test if our results hold for alternative measures 
of the dependent variable. Firstly, we report the results for the normal publications count, not 
adjusted for co-author numbers (descriptive statistics in Table A5). Before estimating these 
models, we exclude researchers in the three applied physics labs who tend to work in large 
teams of up to 300 authors and could skew the results; this leaves a sample of 250 academics. 
The estimations accounting for selection and reverse causality are reported in Table A6 
Columns 1 and 2. The results confirm the insignificant funding effect. The female dummy, 
however, loses significance and the marginal effect turns insignificant for the sub-sample of 
non-applicants. At the same time the female-child dummy enters negative and significant, 
suggesting that, not accounting for co-author numbers, overall, women produce fewer 
publications following the arrival of a child in both the applicant and non-applicant samples.24 
In a second robustness check (Table A6 Columns 3 and 4), we regress on a citation 
count that is not year-normalized (descriptive statistics in Table A5). For the non-normalized 
citation measure the instruments cannot fully solve endogeneity and the Hansen J-test cannot 
reject overidentification of the instruments. Consequently, funding enters significantly. The 
negative child effect for women remains strong and significant in the sample of those that do 
not apply for funding. 
We conducted additional robustness checks using alternative quality/impact measures 
provided by Elsevier, Source-Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) and the SCImago Journal 
Rank (SJR) (descriptive statistics in Table A5). These results are reported in Table A7 and 
confirm the insignificant primary gender effect and the motherhood penalty found in the 
CiteScore estimations. Further, for a subset of publications, we were able to record Thomson 
Reuters JIF and the Article Influence Score (AIS). Results not reported here confirmed the 
overall findings of the Elsevier measures. 
                                                             
24 The robustness of the results was also confirmed in an IV/GMM Poisson model on the publication count 
outcome. The estimation is available upon request.  
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Appendix 3: Appendix Tables 
 
Table A1: Entry and exit into the sample by year 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Total presences 211 212 213 213 221 229 230 230 228 224 
Out (first year of absence) - 7 2 6 5 3 9 8 10 4 
In (first year of presence) - 8 8 0 10 11 10 9 8 0 
Note: Employment is only observed until 2009. Dependent variables were collected up to 2010.  
Table A2: Years of tenure of each academic 
# of years 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Academics present 7 9 12 11 12 14 16 16 19 160 
 
Table A3: Correlations amongst lab variables  
  Variables   (17)   (18)   (19)   (20)   (21)   (22)   (23)   (24)   (25)   (26) 
(17) Single person lab 1.000 
(18) Lab size -0.483 1.000 
(19) (Mean age lab-50)/10 0.033 -0.105 1.000 
(20) Professors lab -0.463 0.150 0.569 1.000 
(21) Publications lab -0.472 0.060 -0.071 0.249 1.000 
(22) Citations lab -0.365 0.064 -0.062 0.223 0.267 1.000 
(23) CiteScore lab -0.641 0.298 -0.113 0.305 0.518 0.543 1.000 
(24) Ln(EU-ITA fund lab+1) -0.387 0.356 0.012 0.229 0.305 0.173 0.293 1.000 
(25) Postdoc hours -0.089 -0.099 0.073 0.141 0.209 0.123 0.167 0.177 1.000 
(26) PhD Student hours -0.081 0.026 -0.010 0.050 0.349 0.141 0.153 0.282 0.344 1.000 




Table A4: Results of OLS regression on research outcomes 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Ln(adj.publications+1) Ln(norm.citations+1) Ln(CiteScore+1) 
 b se b se b se 
Ln(Italian funding+1) 0.014*** 0.004 0.006** 0.003 0.013*** 0.004 
Female -0.167*** 0.054 -0.038 0.059 -0.030 0.115 
Teaching hours -0.008 0.009 -0.007 0.009 -0.001 0.015 
Female#Teaching 
hours 
0.016 0.014 0.008 0.013 0.007 0.029 
Administrative post 0.074* 0.042 -0.021 0.036 0.082 0.053 
Female#Administrative 
post 
-0.058 0.061 0.102 0.081 -0.108 0.102 
Small child (0-3) 0.033 0.057 0.137** 0.055 0.159*** 0.055 
Female#small child -0.119* 0.070 -0.151** 0.066 -0.229** 0.101 
Controls       
(Age-50)/10 -0.195*** 0.023 -0.131*** 0.025 -0.362*** 0.040 
(Age-50)/102 -0.043*** 0.012 -0.016* 0.009 -0.018 0.017 
Pr(professor) 0.587*** 0.085 0.315*** 0.087 0.941*** 0.124 
Ln(coauthors+1)   0.095*** 0.014   
Lab measures       
Single person lab -0.131** 0.056 -0.001 0.046 -0.181** 0.085 
Lab size -0.010** 0.004 -0.007** 0.003 -0.002 0.010 
Mean age lab -0.021 0.024 -0.037 0.025 -0.101** 0.040 
Professors lab -0.014 0.065 0.085 0.064 0.217** 0.099 
Publications lab 0.047* 0.024 0.032 0.024 -0.051 0.033 
Citations lab -0.001 0.001 0.004*** 0.001   
CiteScore lab     0.053*** 0.015 
Ln(EU-ITA funding 
lab+1) 
-0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.004 0.003 
PhD Student hours 0.014*** 0.004 0.007** 0.003 0.018*** 0.004 
Chemistry -0.016 0.030 -0.044 0.033 -0.061 0.045 
Constant 0.337*** 0.064 0.157** 0.067 0.636*** 0.109 
Adjusted R2 0.254  0.219  0.229  
dydx(Female) -0.128*** 0.028 -0.015 0.027 -0.044 0.045 
Note: N = 2097; clusters = 262 in individual id, 86 in lab. *** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). Year 
dummies included; robust clustered standard errors, clustered at the individual and lab levels. Publication counts are co-
author adjusted. Citations are year normalized. 
  
40 
Table A5: Additional descriptive statistics 
 mean sd p50 min max 
Publications (normal 
count) 
4.58 6.58 3.00 0.00 73.00 
Citations (average) 16.54 21.31 10.67 0.00 262.00 
SNIP (average) 1.08 0.69 1.20 0.00 8.85 
SJR (average) 1.43 1.16 1.37 0.00 17.35 
SNIP lab 0.98 0.59 1.06 0.00 5.29 
SJR lab 1.30 0.93 1.27 0.00 9.29 
Zero initial SNIP 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Ln(initial SNIP) 1.04 0.58 1.18 -2.14 2.18 
Zero initial SJR 0.10 0.30 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Ln(initial SJR) 1.23 0.78 1.41 -1.91 2.85 
Note: Number of observations = 2097 and observation period is 2001 to 2010. The average SNIP and SJR of the 2011 to 




Table A6: Results of two-stage least square  and OLS regression accounting for selection on 
research outcomes, robustness tests 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Ln(publications+1) Ln(citations+1) 
 2nd Stage 2SLS Not selected 2nd Stage 2SLS Not selected 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Ln(Italian funding+1) -0.079  0.156**  
 (0.051)  (0.076)  
Female -0.247 0.070 0.507 0.125 
 (0.258) (0.118) (0.392) (0.199) 
Teaching hours 0.002 -0.007 0.055 0.022 
 (0.026) (0.023) (0.055) (0.029) 
Female#Teaching hours 0.014 -0.020 -0.058 -0.016 
 (0.060) (0.028) (0.081) (0.044) 
Administrative post 0.110 0.138* 0.075 0.297* 
 (0.102) (0.073) (0.100) (0.169) 
Female#Administrative post 0.073 -0.061 -0.334 -0.065 
 (0.202) (0.111) (0.246) (0.250) 
Small child 0.167 0.080 -0.006 0.210 
 (0.152) (0.141) (0.183) (0.133) 
Female#small child -0.351* -0.317** -0.217 -0.566** 
 (0.201) (0.157) (0.240) (0.225) 
(Age-50)/10 -0.471*** -0.455*** -0.549*** -0.669*** 
 (0.074) (0.067) (0.159) (0.077) 
(Age-50)/102 0.018 0.013 0.063 0.005 
 (0.051) (0.025) (0.069) (0.038) 
Pr(professor) 1.166*** 1.062*** 1.102** 1.475*** 
 (0.217) (0.236) (0.498) (0.286) 
Ln(coauthors+1)   0.397*** 0.162*** 
   (0.120) (0.046) 
Chemistry 0.054 -0.189** -0.135 -0.258** 
 (0.110) (0.089) (0.155) (0.106) 
Zero initial adj.pub |  0.532* 0.077 0.612* 0.359* 
norm.cit | CiteScore (0.309) (0.111) (0.363) (0.185) 
Ln(initial adj.pub | 0.496*** 0.337*** 0.343*** 0.338*** 
norm.cit | Citescore (0.099) (0.052) (0.066) (0.049) 
𝛼 𝜌 -0.057** -0.013** 0.040 -0.004 
 (0.026) (0.006) (0.033) (0.011) 
Constant 0.414 0.091 -1.376** -0.188 
 (0.290) (0.208) (0.643) (0.231) 
Lab controls YES YES YES YES 
Observations 732 1024 753 1087 
Adjusted R2 0.108 0.378 -0.055 0.420 
Hansen J-test (p-val.) 0.448 0.547 0.0618 0.176 
Underidentification test (p-value) 0.0456  0.0526  
dydx(Female) -0.205* -0.051 0.192 -0.017 
 (0.105) (0.065) (0.167) (0.091) 
Note: *** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). Year dummies included; robust clustered standard errors 
in parentheses, clustered at the individual and lab levels. High energy physics and other areas of physics relying on large 





Table A7: Results of two-stage least square regression with selection on research outcomes, 
robustness test 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Ln(SNIP+1) Ln(SJR+1) 
 2nd Stage 2SLS Not selected 2nd Stage 2SLS Not selected 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Ln(Italian funding+1) -0.002  -0.005  
 (0.015)  (0.021)  
Female 0.100 0.073 0.199 0.108* 
 (0.098) (0.051) (0.142) (0.063) 
Teaching hours 0.012 0.002 0.013 0.006 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.014) (0.012) 
Female#Teaching hours -0.022 -0.002 -0.051* -0.011 
 (0.023) (0.012) (0.028) (0.015) 
Administrative post 0.005 0.064 0.002 -0.015 
 (0.029) (0.049) (0.045) (0.114) 
Female#Administrative post -0.052 -0.057 -0.108 0.076 
 (0.060) (0.069) (0.089) (0.134) 
Small child (0-3) 0.078 0.039 0.114 0.079* 
 (0.057) (0.032) (0.076) (0.042) 
Female#small child -0.034 -0.167** -0.021 -0.259*** 
 (0.076) (0.069) (0.107) (0.083) 
Controls     
(Age-50)/10 -0.174*** -0.234*** -0.195*** -0.260*** 
 (0.028) (0.032) (0.041) (0.036) 
(Age-50)/102 0.022 0.019* 0.030* 0.023 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.018) (0.015) 
Professor 0.386*** 0.517*** 0.349*** 0.580*** 
 (0.084) (0.092) (0.134) (0.111) 
Chemistry -0.022 -0.124*** -0.021 -0.140*** 
 (0.039) (0.030) (0.055) (0.039) 
Zero initial SNIP | SJR 0.020 -0.107** -0.026 -0.089 
 (0.076) (0.050) (0.074) (0.058) 
Ln(initial SNIP | SJR) 0.197*** 0.172*** 0.240*** 0.202*** 
 (0.029) (0.031) (0.030) (0.028) 
 
-0.009 -0.007** -0.013 -0.009*** 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.011) (0.003) 
Constant 0.297** 0.230*** 0.365** 0.207*** 
 (0.121) (0.064) (0.158) (0.079) 
Lab controls YES YES YES YES 
Observations 753 1087 753 1087 
Adjusted R2 0.189 0.362 0.213 0.382 
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.465 0.457 0.411 0.491 
Underidentification test (p-value) 0.0379  0.0365  
dydx(Female) -0.001 0.036 -0.031 0.040 
 (0.041) (0.024) 0.056 (0.031) 
Note: *** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). Year dummies included; robust standard errors in 
parentheses, clustered at individual and lab. First stage regressions are available upon request. 
